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As Robert Veatch observes, bioethics as a field is fundamentally oriented towards being 
“applied to real problems of the real world.”  That is, although theories of ethics do play a role in 
the field, these theories must be “integrate[d]…with detailed knowledge of the relevant facts and 
customs of a particular sphere of life.”  One way of making this progression is to follow the two-
tiered system of standard and operational test such as that used by Allen Buchanan and Dan 
Brock in their discussion of their balancing model of competence.  In this paper I will argue in 
favor of a representative (although not naïve) empirical operational test for the reasonable person 
standard.  In each of the three sections that comprise the first chapter, I will identify the 
normative goals of a bioethical context and compare the reasonable person standard to its main 
competitors in light of those goals.  Then, in the second half of the paper, I will defend both the 
reasonable person standard itself and the use of empirical data as an operational test for it.  This 
defense will only be a partial one, however, as there are certain limits to the empirical approach.  
The goal of this paper is to show how empirical data can be used, albeit with some limitations, to 
help bring some clarity and precision to a standard that is often criticized for lacking precisely 
those qualities. 
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 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION: NORMATIVE CONTEXTS AND THE REASONABLE 
PERSON STANDARD 
The reasonable person standard was originally articulated in tort law to elaborate the 
standard of care, breach of which was a requisite element of a successful negligence action.  A 
defendant is determined to have fulfilled the standard of care if he or she acted as a reasonable 
person would have acted in the same or similar circumstances.  More recently, the reasonable 
person standard has also become a decision-making tool in the context of medical research and 
clinical practice.  Bioethicists have proposed the use of the reasonable person standard in three 
specific medical contexts: clinical informed consent, surrogate decision-making, and human 
subjects research.  Despite this, the reasonable person standard is not uncontroversial.  Some 
bioethicists claim that other standards are superior, while others claim that the reasonable person 
standard is too vague or too inflexible to serve as a means of ethical decision-making.  Whether 
or not the reasonable person standard is an appropriate one to use in bioethics, it must be 
admitted at the very least that the bioethical reasonable person standard must be understood 
differently than the legal reasonable person standard.
1
  The process of evaluating the bioethical 
                                                 
1
 One reason for this is that the legal system and the medical system have very different normative goals.  A second 
reason is that, in the context of law, juries are often asked to determine whether a defendant has satisfied the 
reasonable person standard.  Because there is rarely anything like a jury in the medical context, the reasonable 
person standard cannot be understood exactly the same way in both contexts. 
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reasonable person standard begins by attempting to understand the context of medicine and how 
the reasonable person standard could be used to make ethical decisions therein. 
As Robert Veatch observes, bioethics as a field is fundamentally oriented towards being 
“applied to real problems of the real world.”  That is, although theories of ethics do play a role in 
the field, these theories must be “integrate[d]…with detailed knowledge of the relevant facts and 
customs of a particular sphere of life.”2  As such, any bioethical thought will depend at least 
somewhat on the context of medicine.  Medicine is the primary normative context in which 
bioethical reasoning and discussion occur.  Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, however, note 
that, in order to speak to practical contexts at all, theories in bioethics must take into account not 
just the broad context of medicine but “a particular context or range of cases” within medicine.3  
Given this requirement, bioethicists must find some way to progress from relatively abstract 
guideposts (e.g. principles, paradigm cases, or goals) to relatively specific recommendations or 
evaluations.  One way of making this progression is to follow the two-tiered system of standard 
and operational test such as that used by Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in their discussion of 
their balancing model of competence. 
There are at least three noteworthy aspects of standards as a means of applying theory to 
practical context.  First, as Buchanan and Brock suggest, standards are answerable to a context-
specific ethical goal.  In the case of surrogate decision-making, the goal is to find an appropriate 
balance between respecting an individual’s autonomy and safeguarding his or her well-being 
with regards to honoring that individual’s decision.  To be justified, a standard of competence 
must serve this normative goal of balancing well-being and autonomy.  Standards alone, 
                                                 
2
 Robert Veatch, “Medical Ethics: An Introduction.” Medical Ethics. Ed. Robert Veatch (Sudbury: Jones and Barlett 
Publishers, 1997), 5. 
3
 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
15. 
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however, are not sufficient to determine whether any given situation meets the standard in 
question.  Rather, a standard must have an operational test that is used “for ascertaining whether 
a given standard…is met.”4  The need for and possibility of identifying an operational test is the 
second noteworthy aspect of a standard. 
The key attribute of an operational test is that it clarifies and concretizes whatever 
elements of a standard are vague.  Operational tests will be more defensible the more that they do 
this validly (i.e., insofar as the concretization isn’t arbitrary but actually measures the relevant 
elements) and reliably (i.e., insofar as they produce consistent results).  The ease of finding an 
appropriate operational test will vary depending on the standard one seeks to apply and, of 
course, the degree of complexity – conceptual and material – of the normative context in which it 
is to be applied.  The third noteworthy aspect of a standard, however, is that standards are not 
always needed.  There are many cases in bioethics and elsewhere in which the proper ethical 
course is clear enough to make the use of a standard superfluous.  In these cases, the ethical 
features of a situation can be clearly identified, and there is broad and well-founded consensus as 
to the proper course of action given those features.  Using a more indirect evaluative approach, 
like a standard, in such cases would be superfluous, and so it would be an error to apply the 
reasonable person standard or indeed any standard to every case. 
In order to understand the reasonable person standard as it has been applied in bioethics, 
then, it will be necessary to know the ethical goals of the various contexts in which it has been 
invoked and the operational test used to apply the standard to real cases, as well as to distinguish 
between those cases for which a standard is needed and those for which none is.  The contexts 
and their normative goals may vary, but the definition of the standard itself should remain 
                                                 
4
 Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18. 
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consistent and stable, at least if there is to be one and the same standard across contexts.  For the 
purposes of this paper, only three such contexts will be examined: disclosure in clinical informed 
consent, surrogate decision-making, and human subjects research.  Although these are almost 
certainly not the only contexts in which the reasonable person standard has been used, they all 
have relatively well-defined ethical goals and are sufficiently diverse at least to begin the search 
for a generalized statement of the reasonable person standard and an appropriate operational test 
of that standard. 
Initial examination of these contexts indicates three shared elements of the reasonable 
person standard: it asks what a (1) hypothetical (2) reasonable person would do, need, or want 
(3) in the same or similar circumstances as are present in the specific case under investigation.  
Thus when the actions, beliefs, or requirements of this hypothetical reasonable person are 
determined by an appropriate operational test to align with the ethically relevant facts of a given 
situation, the user of the standard will conclude that the situation is ethically acceptable.
5
  
Alternatively, should the two not align, the reasonable person standard will indicate which steps 
must be taken to bring them into alignment.  All of this, however, can only happen after context-
specific goals have been identified and the reasonable person standard is interpreted in light of 
those goals. 
In what follows I will argue in favor of a representative (although not naïve) empirical 
operational test for the reasonable person standard.  In each of the next three sections, I will 
identify the normative goals of a bioethical context and compare the reasonable person standard 
to its main competitors in light of those goals.  Then, in the second half of the paper, I will 
defend both the reasonable person standard itself and the use of empirical data as an operational 
                                                 
5
 Or, at least, that it is ethically acceptable insofar as the standard can determine. 
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test for it.  This defense will only be a partial one, however, as there are certain limits to the 
empirical approach.  The goal of this paper is to show how empirical data can be used, albeit 
with some limitations, to help bring some clarity and precision to a standard that is often 
criticized for lacking precisely those qualities. 
1.1 THE REASONABLE PERSON, CLINICAL INFORMED CONSENT, AND CORE 
DISCLOSURE 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, over the past forty years “the primary 
justification advanced for requirements of informed consent has been to protect [the] 
autonomous choice[s]” of patients, and a secondary justification has been “to minimize the 
potential for harm” to those same individuals.6  Informed consent for Beauchamp and Childress 
has seven elements, of which disclosure is a “pivotal” component.7  Accordingly, they take the 
success or failure of the ethical goal of obtaining informed consent to depend in large part on the 
subsidiary goal of performing sufficiently robust disclosures to patients.  It is for this reason that, 
within the relatively broad context of informed consent, the reasonable person standard has been 
often applied specifically to the matter of a core disclosure and is used to ask which information 
would be needed in order for any hypothetical reasonable person in a similar situation to make a 
materially informed choice.  However, the reasonable person standard is not the only standard 
that has been invoked in this area.  In order for its use to be justified, then, it must be not only 
                                                 
6
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 77. 
7
 Ibid 80. 
 6 
sufficient to achieve the ethical goal in question, i.e., to properly balance patients’ autonomy and 
welfare interests, but also superior to all of its known competitors in doing so. 
Before attempting such a justification, though, it is important to explore an ambiguity in 
the ethical goal of disclosure as phrased above.  When one asks which information would be 
needed for any hypothetical reasonable person in a similar situation to make a materially 
informed choice, there are two ways of understanding the question.  On the one hand, one might 
want to generate a single, fixed collection of information that can be provided to all patients in a 
given situation.  Such a disclosure would contain the information that is necessary for materially 
informed decision-making in that situation, and so would serve as a baseline or beginning 
disclosure.  This is the aim of a core disclosure and is the goal that the reasonable person 
standard has been said to achieve.  On the other hand, one might want to know how to expand on 
the core disclosure so as to provide the patient with information that is not just necessary but is 
also sufficient to make a materially informed decision.  This interpretation seeks not a minimal 
core disclosure, but one that satisfies the particular patient’s informational needs more fully.  
While the reasonable person standard has not been proposed as a means of satisfying a robust set 
of informational needs, it will be instructive to keep this second interpretation in mind as well. 
Traditionally, the standard that was invoked to evaluate disclosure approved those 
interactions in which physicians “conform with the customary disclosure that competent 
physicians would make under similar circumstances.”8  Considered in light of the primary goal 
of protecting autonomy, it is difficult to justify the use of this professional practice standard.
9
  In 
                                                 
8
 Jeffrey Botkin, “Prenatal Screening: Professional Standards and the Limits of Parental Choice,” in Obstetrics & 
Gynecology (May 1990), 875. 
9
 Of course, protecting autonomy was not considered the primary goal at the time this standard was widely used.  
Rather, consent was focused on bodily welfare and convincing patients to accept the treatments that served that 
interest. 
 7 
order for this standard to protect autonomy, physicians would have to know which information is 
needed to protect the autonomy of patients in general.  Yet in actuality the professional practice 
standard “reduces individual patients to generalized clinical scenarios,”10 thus replacing the 
diverse interests of actual patients with the presumption of a one-dimensional desire to attain 
some idealized state of health. 
Although this reduction of diverse interests to a smaller set of medical interests does not 
fit well with the primary goal of the informed consent context, either for a minimal core 
disclosure or a more robust disclosure, it can still serve the secondary goal of “[r]educing risk 
and avoiding unfairness and exploitation”11 and it can still serve as a starting point for upholding 
patient autonomy.  Presumably patients do (at least typically) want to achieve the medical 
outcomes that play out in these idealized clinical scenarios, and presumably they do therefore 
need the information required by the professional practice standard.  Without this information, it 
would be difficult for patients to come to a sufficiently thorough understanding of the situations 
in which they find themselves to be protected from harm or to make informed choices in 
accordance with their own interests.  Because patients’ interests are typically also more diverse 
than the narrow medical welfare interests that are served by the professional practice standard, 
however, it is implausible to suggest that their autonomy can be reliably protected using that 
standard. 
The reasonable person standard improves on the professional practice standard by 
“tak[ing] the limits of disclosure out of the hands of physicians and plac[ing] them in the hands 
                                                 
10
 Ryan Childers, Pamela Lipsett and Timothy Pawlik, “Informed Consent and the Surgeon,” Journal of the 
American College of Surgeons (April 2009), 629. 
11
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 77. 
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of a hypothetical individual who has reasonable requirements for information.”12  This shift 
eliminates the problem of treating real patients like abstractions in medical textbooks, but that 
does not automatically mean that the reasonable person standard is the proper standard to use.  
Indeed, several authors have objected to the reasonable person standard on the grounds that, 
much like the professional practice standard, it holds a diverse population to a monolithic 
benchmark that has been established by a mere abstraction.
13
  On this thinking, “the reasonable 
person standard…does not go far enough in tailoring the process [of disclosure] to patient 
individuality.”14  A still-more responsive standard, the subjective standard, is said to resolve this 
problem by requiring physicians to disclose whatever information the current patient requires.  
On this standard, every patient’s autonomy would be protected, at least in theory.  This 
theoretical protection, however, would not come for free.  Indeed, its cost may even be 
prohibitive – at least, with respect to developing a core disclosure. 
As Beauchamp and Childress observe, “patients often do not know what information 
would be relevant for their deliberations, and a doctor cannot reasonably be expected to do an 
exhaustive background and character analysis of each patient to determine what information 
would be relevant.”15  In other words, if one defers entirely to the informational desires of 
individual patients without providing any kind of oversight at all, one does indeed jeopardize the 
autonomy of those patients who wrongly believe that they can identify the information that they 
themselves need in a core disclosure.  This would not be a problem if patients always desired the 
                                                 
12
 Botkin “Prenatal Screening,” 876. 
13
 See e.g. Childers, Lipsett, and Pawlik, “Surgeon”; Robert Redmon, “How children can be respected as 'ends' yet 
still be used as subjects in non-therapeutic research,” Journal of Medical Ethics, 12 (1986); Elizabeth Boetzkes, 
“Genetic Knowledge and Third-Party Interests,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8, (1999); and Evelyn 
Chan and Daniel Sulmasy, “What Should Men Know about Prostate-specific Antigen Screening before Giving 
Informed Consent?” The American Journal of Medicine (October 1998). 
14
 Childers, Lipsett, and Pawlik, “Surgeon,” 630. 
15
 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 83. 
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information that they in fact need, but of course this is not the case.  Regrettable though this may 
be, some patients feel entirely comfortable consenting to undergo a procedure only to find out 
afterwards that they had been ignorant of material information.  Accordingly, there is a 
philosophical reason to look outside of patients’ actual desires.  An additional problem for the 
subjective standard is that physicians have neither the time nor the information-gathering 
resources to determine the unique disclosure needs of any one patient, let alone each and every 
patient they see.  It is important to note that this problem represents not a competing ethical goal 
but rather a practical side constraint in the context of informed consent.  That is, the burdens that 
the subjective standard would place on physicians are not burdens to be compared to and 
weighed against the obligation that those same physicians have to protect their patients’ 
autonomy.  Instead, Beauchamp and Childress appear to reject the subjective standard because 
the conditions that would enable it to achieve the ethical goal of formulating a core disclosure are 
simply not feasible in the real world.
16
 
The subjective standard is still the superior standard in other circumstances – say, in the 
latter phases of the disclosure process, in which it would be inappropriate to excuse physicians 
from disclosing information that an individual patient does need to know but that a hypothetical 
reasonable person would not need.
17
  Because core disclosures are not meant to meet the 
individual informational needs of every patient, however, it would be a mistake to conclude 
either the subjective standard or the reasonable person standard must be used for minimal 
disclosures and more robust disclosures alike.  The same point can be made on the grounds that 
the subjective standard can only be a standard in a procedural sense whereas the reasonable 
                                                 
16
 On this point see also Childers, Lipsett, and Pawlik “Surgeon” and Robert Wheeler, “Consent in surgery,” Annals 
of the Royal College of Surgeons of England 88 (2006). 
17
 Here, as earlier, a patient is only said to “need” that information without which his or her decision would not be 
sufficiently autonomous.  These informational needs will, therefore, vary from individual to individual. 
 10 
person standard can be used to standardize the content of a disclosure.  The two standards can be 
used cooperatively in the informed consent process, but only if it is first understood which 
standard is best matched with which context-specific goal within that process. 
Howard Brody, however, appears to argue in a 1989 article that the reasonable person 
standard is not appropriate to use at all.  The reasonable person standard, Brody says, places too 
heavy a burden on physicians because, even though it does not commit them to learning every 
relevant detail of patients’ lives, it seemingly requires them “to rattle off at a moment’s notice a 
detailed list of significant risks attached to any of the many drugs and therapeutic modalities they 
recommend.”  Just as Beauchamp and Childress suggest that the subjective standard could not 
realistically be used to generate core disclosures, Brody presents a practical side constraint to the 
use of the reasonable person standard in the same context.  Though the subjective standard may 
ask too much of physicians, it would also be implausible to expect physicians to rapidly 
reproduce “detailed lists[s] of significant risks” from memory.  Worse still, he says that the 
reasonable person standard’s focus on disclosure leads to autonomy-jeopardizing behaviors on 
the part of physicians, such as their paying attention only to “what they said to the patient [rather 
than] how the patient used or thought about that information subsequently.”18  In fact, however, 
the first of these is neither a problem for the reasonable person standard nor a side-constraint to 
it.  Because the reasonable person standard does not actually require physicians to have perfect 
and instantaneous recall,
19
 it would be incorrect to say that it truly does commit physicians to an 
obligation that they cannot meet. 
                                                 
18
 Howard Brody, “Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care,” The Hastings Center Report 19.5 (1989), 6. 
19
 One possible way to avoid this would be for physicians to use materials that provide information in such a way as 
to be essentially equivalent to instantaneous and perfect recall, such as brochures or videos.  See e.g. Chan and 
Sulmasy, “What Should Men Know,” 272; Grant Gillett, “At Last – Some Reasonable Comments On Informed 
Consent,” The New Zealand Medical Journal (October 2003). 
 11 
As for Brody’s increased focus on understanding, this is better understood not as an 
attack on the reasonable person standard but rather as an attempt to shift the informed consent 
process from focusing almost single-mindedly on the element of disclosure of information to a 
more balanced focus on disclosure as well as understanding, that is, to a focus on transparency.  
Because the main thrust of Brody’s argument is to ensure that patients “see the basic reasoning 
[that a physician] use[s] to arrive at the recommended treatment” – in essence, to propose an 
alternative subsidiary goal for the primary ethical goal of protecting autonomy – it should be no 
surprise that the reasonable person standard can accommodate his argument.  After all, standards 
inherit details from the ethical goals of the contexts in which they are placed, so there will not be 
any justified standard that is absolutely incompatible with such a goal, even when that goal is 
transparency.  And indeed, Brody’s own suggested replacement for the current model of 
informed consent is compatible with the reasonable person standard.  One can simply adapt the 
reasonable person standard to the goal of transparency by saying that a physician has done an 
ethically acceptable job of disclosure when a hypothetical reasonable person would have 
understood the physician’s basic thinking.20 
Merely being compatible with the goal of transparency does not mean, however, that the 
reasonable person standard would do enough to ensure that physicians’ thought processes are 
transparent to their patients.
21
  Brody defines a transparency standard so that “disclosure is 
adequate when the physician’s basic thinking has been rendered transparent to the patient,” as 
measured by the “physician’s own thinking” about what is relevant.22  In a sense, this is an 
                                                 
20
 Another possible way to seek to enforce the value of transparency would be to say that physicians must explain 
their reasoning until they are sure that each individual patient has understood their essential reasoning; this would be 
the subjective standard for transparency. 
21
 Nor, of course, is the goal of transparency (as defined by Brody) necessarily an appropriate one for the context. 
22
 Brody, “Transparency,” 7. 
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extreme version of the professional practice standard as interpreted through the goal of 
transparency: rather than asking a group of physicians to determine which information is 
material, it asks individual physicians to determine when information has been understood and is 
material.  The question that the transparency standard faces, then, is whether individual 
physicians can be trusted to know when their patients have comprehended their basic thinking or 
whether that understanding would be better measured by reference to a hypothetical reasonable 
person. 
Here, as with the question of materiality, the issue will usually come down to a matter of 
values and interests.  It is one thing to ask that a patient be able to memorize and recite his or her 
physician’s basic reasoning, but Brody requires much more than that.  In order for physicians to 
render their reasoning transparent to their patients, they must find a way to communicate that 
reasoning so that patients can parse it and fit it into a recognizable set of values and interests.  
Merely understanding, for example, that one’s oncologist prefers one treatment over all the 
others because it lowers the risk of metastases is not enough unless one also understands what 
metastases are, why they might be considered to be bad enough to outweigh any additional 
burdens of the proposed treatment, and so on.  One needn’t agree with the oncologist’s analysis – 
one individual can find another’s thinking to be transparent and still disagree with it – but one 
would have to acquire a relatively deep level of understanding in order to satisfy Brody’s goal of 
transparency.  It is difficult to imagine, however, that individual physicians will reliably be able 
to help their patients reach such an understanding given that physicians as a professional group 
tend to operate with a very different set of interests and values than patients do.  Just as in the 
case of determining materiality for a core disclosure, it seems necessary to take the matter of 
transparency out of the hands of physicians and place it, at least, in the hands of a hypothetical 
 13 
individual with reasonable requirements for understanding – that is, it seems necessary to replace 
the professionally-driven standard with the reasonable person standard.  Thus the reasonable 
person standard appears to be superior to Brody’s transparency standard even if he is right in 
arguing for transparency as being of primary importance.
23
  There is, however, one apparent flaw 
in the reasonable person standard that cannot be explained away so easily: that it cannot (at least 
practically) be tested in an operational way and so cannot be used to inform action. 
One objection leveled by several authors against the reasonable person standard is that 
“the determination of how much information a ‘reasonable person’ in the patient’s situation 
would want is extremely difficult.”24  In essence, this claim states that the reasonable person 
standard is prohibitively difficult to operationalize and so cannot be relied upon in real-world 
settings.  Like Beauchamp and Childress’s argument against the subjective standard, this 
objection attempts to identify a reason to reject the reasonable person standard that does not 
center on an ethical flaw.  And indeed, if this complaint is accurate it is difficult to see how the 
reasonable person standard could succeed.  After all, standards are meant to be used as a way of 
applying high-level ethical concepts to ground-level actions or requirements, so any standard that 
only has upward connections cannot succeed regardless of how enticing it might otherwise be.  
Whether the reasonable person standard can connect downwards as well as upwards will be 
investigated in detail at the end of this chapter, but assuming for the moment that the reasonable 
person standard does not face any unresolvable practical issues it seems fair to say that it is the 
best of the known standards for evaluating instances of informed consent, as it balances 
                                                 
23
 If Brody errs in seeking to redefine the values at play in this context, the reasonable person standard is clearly 
superior: as an extreme version of the professional practice standard that would allow individual physicians so set 
their own limits, his transparency standard would fail for the same reasons that the professional practice standard 
fails. 
24
 Dewey Zeigler, et al., “How Much Information About Adverse Effects of Medication Do Patients Want From 
Physicians?,” Archives of Internal Medicine 161 (2001), 707; see also Childers, Lipsett, and Pawlik, “Surgeon,” 
629; and Botkin, “Prenatal Screening,” 876. 
 14 
autonomy and welfare better than the professional standard while avoiding the side constraints 
that affect the subjective standard. 
1.2 THE REASONABLE PERSON AND SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING 
For Buchanan and Brock, finding a suitable standard to use in surrogate decision-making 
is a matter of ensuring that the standard properly reflects “the values of self-determination [i.e., 
autonomy] and the individual’s well-being.”25  To this end, authors have proposed several 
standards, among them the substituted judgment standard, the pure autonomy standard, the best 
interests standard, the current interests standard, and, of course, the reasonable person standard.  
Unlike in the case of informed consent, however, the appropriate standard to apply in a given 
case of surrogate decision-making depends on the details of that case because of the wide 
variability in the ethically relevant factors a case may possess.  In other words, identifying the 
proper standard for a given case will be in part a matter of identifying the relevant sub-context of 
surrogate decision-making to which that case belongs. 
One of the most significant variables in surrogate decision-making is the extent to which 
the patient’s desires or preferences are epistemically available to the surrogate.  When they are 
known (either through direct contact with the patient, the testimony of a trustworthy surrogate or 
proxy, or an advance directive), they must be taken into account even if they will ultimately be 
overridden.
26
  Accounting for patients’ autonomy interests requires no less.  Because the 
reasonable person standard does not even consider the desires or wishes of the actual patient in 
                                                 
25
 Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, 90. 
26
 Say, because the desired procedure or treatment would be medically futile. 
 15 
question, instead focusing entirely on those that a hypothetical patient would have, it would be 
inappropriate to use in this subcontext and is inferior to the pure autonomy and substituted 
judgment standards.  By the same token, though, those standards are problematic when the 
patient’s desires are not known.  In such a case, a pure autonomy standard will have no instance 
of autonomous expression of preferences or values with which to proceed, and a surrogate 
decision-maker will not have the information he or she needs to substitute his or her own 
judgment grounded in that information for the patient’s decision-making.  For this reason the 
focus shifts entirely to well-being when an incompetent patient’s previously expressed 
autonomous desires cannot be ascertained.  This is the subcontext in which numerous sources 
agree that the proper course of action is to use the patient’s best interests as a guide.27  The 
proper way to establish what is in the best interests of such a patient, however, is somewhat more 
controversial. 
The reasonable person standard, for example, would not face the same difficulties as the 
pure autonomy and substituted judgment standards when “a patient is unknown to the clinician 
[and] no readily interpretable advance directive is available”28 because it does not rely on facts 
about the values and preferences of the individual patient.  But it is not as clear that a 
hypothetical reasonable person would be able to reliably identify the best interests of an 
incompetent patient.  Robert Redmon, for example, claims that treatment of a comatose patient 
can be justified by the reasonable person standard “on the grounds that if he were awake, and 
rational, it is reasonable to assume that he would agree to the treatment” and that treatment of a 
                                                 
27
 See e.g. Ghan-Shyam Lohiya, Lilia Tan-Figueroa and Francis Crinella, “End-of-Life Care for a Man with 
Developmental Disabilities,” Journal of the American Board of Family Practice (January-February 2003); Annas, 
George. “‘Culture of Life’ Politics at the Bedside - The Case of Terri Schiavo.” The New England Journal of 
Medicine 352, no. 16 (April 2005): 1710-1715. 
28
 Robert Palmer and Kenneth Iserson, “The Critical Patient Who Refuses Treatment: An Ethical Dilemma,” The 
Journal of Emergency Medicine 15.5 (1997), 729. 
 16 
child is justified when one can “expect [that] child to be pleased, to ‘agree retroactively,’ when 
she is an adult.”29  Even assuming that Redmon does not mean to attempt to reconstruct the 
values of individual patients and so fall back into something like the substituted judgment 
standard, this approach is vulnerable to an objection made by Rebecca Dresser and John 
Robertson. 
As they say, “a person’s interests may change drastically once incompetency develops” 
such that it is no longer appropriate to judge that person’s interests by the interests of someone 
who is awake and rational.
30
  In order to avoid this mistake, Dresser and Robertson propose a 
current interests standard according to which the relevant question is “whether treatment actually 
serves the incompetent patient’s existing interests.”31  Like the reasonable person standard, their 
current interests standard is also clearly capable of operating “[i]n cases in which there is no 
valid advance directive and in which substituted judgment is inapplicable,”32 that is, in cases in 
which there is minimal or no information about the patient’s desires.  At least on first glance, 
then, Dresser and Robertson appear to have found a competitor for the reasonable person 
standard in this subcontext, and a strong one at that.  If they are correct in asserting that patients 
with unknowable values should not be treated in a way that disregards their current interests, it 
would be difficult to justify the use of a standard that asks “what a reasonable person would do 
under the circumstances”33 or “what a reasonable person would want done under the same 
circumstances”34 or any of the similar formulations that typically are used by proponents of the 
reasonable person standard.  After all, presumably one must have at least some minimal level of 
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consciousness, rationality, and self-knowledge in order to be a reasonable person, yet it is 
precisely the lack of these qualities that makes a person incapable of expressing his or her own 
preferences.  Since their standard is designed specifically so as to avoid this problem, Dresser 
and Robertson would seem to have proposed a superior standard. 
On a closer look, however, matters are not so clean-cut.  The reasonable person standard 
need not proceed by asking how the currently not-reasonable patient would decide if reasonable, 
thereby misattributing the interests that typically come along with being reasonable to someone 
who currently lacks that attribute.  It could instead ask how a reasonable person would judge the 
best current interests of the patient in question.  For example, Dresser and Robertson claim that 
“[t]he ‘pleasantly senile’ and other debilitated individuals who appear to receive benefits from 
their restricted lives…appear to retain sufficient mental capacity for continued life to hold 
material value for them.”35  Rather than leaving it up to academicians or clinicians to weigh these 
matters according to their own judgment and so decide which “experiences provide ‘a life worth 
living’ to the patient…despite the burdens” of that individual’s condition,36 this could be decided 
by reference to a hypothetical reasonable person – that is, it could be decided by the reasonable 
person standard.  Thus the reasonable person standard can at least survive the initial challenge 
that Dresser and Robertson’s position poses. 
Unfortunately, if neither standard can be eliminated due to a major flaw it will be 
somewhat difficult to compare them until an operational test has been specified for each.  Insofar 
as a particular treatment is obviously in a patient’s best current interests, a hypothetical 
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reasonable person would come to that conclusion (and vice versa).
37
  When a plausible case can 
be made that each of a range of multiple treatment options (potentially including non-treatment) 
might be in an individual’s best interests, however, one encounters the inconvenient fact that the 
hard cases are precisely those in which a person can wrongly identify an individual’s best 
interests and still be counted as a reasonable person (as the phrase goes, those cases “about 
which reasonable people can disagree”) – which is, of course, what makes them hard cases to 
begin with.  This is not to say that a reasonable person could not be convinced of the right 
decision by, say, living out the consequences of making the wrong one.  If 20/20 hindsight is the 
best that the reasonable person standard can guarantee, however, it does not seem to be very well 
suited for use in the original decision-making process or as a way of evaluating decisions that 
have already been made but that must be lived out by individuals who “can furnish us with little 
or no verbal data on how they experience their lives.”38  Of course, this is precisely the sort of 
ambiguity that an operational test is supposed to resolve.  In the absence of such a test for the 
reasonable person standard, however, it is not clear that that standard will be superior to the one 
proposed by Dresser and Robertson.  Further evaluation of the reasonable person standard within 
the context of surrogate decision-making, then, will have to be put off until a test for it can be 
specified. 
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1.3 THE REASONABLE PERSON AND MEDICAL HUMAN SUBJECTS 
RESEARCH 
Human subjects research in medicine, a third area in which the reasonable person 
standard has been invoked, is somewhat more complicated than the contexts of either clinical 
informed consent or surrogate decision-making.  In particular, it appears to have multiple ethical 
goals – seven, according to Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler, and Christine Grady39 – and so 
will have to be broken up into sub-contexts.  Of the seven, only two are commonly associated 
with the reasonable person standard: obtaining informed consent from subjects and ensuring that 
the risk/benefit ratio of the proposed research is appropriate (i.e., human subjects protection). 
In the former of these sub-contexts, the justification for using the reasonable person 
standard runs along the same lines as the justification of its use in the context of clinical 
informed consent.  Because the operating values of the professionals (physicians, investigators) 
are liable to differ from the values of the vulnerable populations (patients, subjects) in both 
contexts, the professional practice standard will not suffice for research subjects any more than it 
will for patients.  Likewise, researchers have no way of meeting the requirements of the 
subjective standard because they simply cannot devote their time to developing a deep personal 
understanding of each and every potential subject.  As in the clinic, then, in human subjects 
protection the reasonable person standard offers an improvement on the professional practice 
standard without asking for the impossible (at least on its face). 
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As for the second sub-context of evaluating the risk/benefit ratio, the main competitor for 
the reasonable person standard appears to be something akin to the professional practice 
standard.  As Robert Veatch describes, rather than relying simply on physicians this standard 
also includes those with professional-level “knowledge of the law, social science, psychology, 
and religious traditions.”  Nonetheless, one would expect that this alternative also has the same 
flaw as the traditional professional practice standard, i.e., that it runs the risk of wrongly 
substituting the values of professionals for those of laypeople (in this case, lay research subjects).  
This would not directly undermine the ethical goal in the same way that it would in the case of 
informed consent, as the fundamental value of ensuring a suitable risk/benefit ratio is not 
autonomy but “the need to avoid the exploitation of subjects.”40  Nonetheless, the risk/benefit 
ratio must be calculated so as to take into account the risks and potential benefits that the 
proposed subject population would actually experience, an experience that would in turn be 
shaped by the actual values and interests of that population.  And indeed, although this 
instantiation of the professional practice standard earns Veatch’s title of the interdisciplinary 
professional standard by virtue of its increased diversity, this change still does not go far enough.  
After all, just as whether “the reasonable person would want to know something is logically still 
an open question even if there is a consensus among the professional group” even if that group is 
composed of a wide variety of professionals instead of only medical ones, the consensus of an 
interdisciplinary professional group regarding the appropriateness of a risk/benefit ratio is not a 
substitute for the representative judgment of a subject population.  It is for this reason that 
Veatch identifies the need for “the ability to judge community attitudes”: 41 without a profession 
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that centers on relating to diverse lay communities, a key piece of information will be missing 
and so the probability of exploiting subjects will be unnecessarily high.
42
 
For these reasons Veatch suggests using “a group more skilled in representing…the 
views of the reasonable person” to weigh risks and benefits – in essence, a reasonable person 
standard.
43
  Nor is Veatch the only author to employ the standard in this context.  Robert Amdur 
and C.J. Biddle, following Baruch Brody, use it to evaluate the use of placebo controls in human 
subjects trials, saying that a study presents an acceptable level of risk only when “a reasonable 
person of an average degree of altruism and risk-aversiveness might consent” to participating.44 
Assuming that some group can successfully represent the views of the reasonable person (i.e., 
that a test can be found for the reasonable person standard), the judgment of that group will be 
superior to the judgment even of an interdisciplinary professional group – at least, when it comes 
to using the relevant set of values. 
There is, however, a complication.  The medical risks and benefits of a proposed study 
need to be thoroughly understood before they can be compared, yet the reasonable person 
standard only specifies the reasonableness of the hypothetical person and does not grant that 
person any particular knowledge or expertise (beyond, perhaps, that which a person could not 
lack and still be counted as reasonable).  In the same way that clinicians may unintentionally 
disregard (or simply be ignorant of) their patients’ diverse interests, it may be the case that a 
hypothetical reasonable person just does not have the professional background necessary to 
compare the risks and benefits of an experiment. 
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Rather than trusting an untutored hypothetical reasonable person, then, one may instead 
want the opinion of a hypothetical reasonable person who has received some degree of education 
about the proposed research.  This notion, however, only emphasizes the importance of finding a 
sensible operational test for the reasonable person standard.  As difficult as it may be to 
determine the beliefs, desires, or needs of an abstract person who is described only as 
“reasonable,” it is more puzzling still to know how such a person might react after taking into 
account technical information from experts.  On top of this, it is unclear how much background 
knowledge a reasonable person would have to possess in order to understand the scientific details 
of a proposed trial in a relatively value-free way.  This is problematic because, as Veatch rightly 
observes, the point of applying the reasonable person standard is to operate based on the norms 
specified by that standard.  Should it be the case that a hypothetical reasonable person requires 
information that has a normative component and the values reflected in that component are in 
conflict with the values that the reasonable person standard would provide, the standard will be 
less reliable.  So, for example, if a research protocol is intended to evaluate the efficacy of a new 
migraine drug and the medical experts can only make themselves understood by saying that at 
best the experimental treatment could offer “very good” pain relief, they will already have 
interfered with the way the process is supposed to work.  The more that the hypothetical 
reasonable person requires such simplifications, the more the standard will be compromised 
relative to its promise to evaluate scenarios based on the needs of a hypothetical reasonable 
person; at the extreme, it will be capable only of reiterating the results of the professional 
standard.  With all of this in mind, I now turn to the task of investigating potential operational 
tests for the reasonable person standard. 
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2.0  SECOND CHAPTER 
Even if some standard or other is needed to make reliably ethical decisions in the three 
contexts listed in chapter 1, and even if the reasonable person standard is the one whose 
conceptual design is best suited to that task, it could still fail to be an appropriate standard to use.  
Much depends on finding a suitable operational test, and so most of this chapter will be devoted 
to defending what might be called a representative test.  The particular representative test 
defended herein will be one in which the relevant values and interests are identified through the 
use of an empirical process in which populations are asked to identify their own values and 
interests in a way that is as direct as possible.  In other words, this test constructs a hypothetical 
member of a population whose precise values and interests may not be held by any actual 
member of that population but which nonetheless represent the values and interests of the 
population as a group.  Because values and interests are only honored when they are reasonable 
in some sense, it is fair to say that this representative test relies on a hypothetical reasonable 
person and so is a way of putting the reasonable person standard into practice.  This test is 
limited in certain ways and must be designed carefully, and those nuances will be explored in 
this chapter.  Before any of that, however, it will be helpful to see why the appropriate standard 
will have to be able to account for relevant differences in populations, and to show that the 
reasonable person has this capability. 
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2.1 THE REASONABLE PERSON? 
2.1.1 Reasonable Person vs. Reasonable Population 
One of the most striking criticisms of the reasonable person standard is found in the 
writing of Elisabeth Boetzkes.  For Boetzkes, the reasonable person standard is meant to provide 
clear and unwavering answers to questions such as whether or not it is acceptable for health care 
professionals who discover a genetic disorder in a parent not to disclose that information to that 
parent’s children.  Before considering the possibility of using a representative test as a way of 
operationalizing the reasonable person standard, she lists and rejects two other tests.   
The first of these tests “is basically a Rawlsian model in which the reasonable person, 
with defensible social values,” analyzes the situation and presents a conclusion.  This test, she 
says, is problematic in that it assumes “cultural homogeneity and gender neutrality” in order to 
guarantee that it will actually reach an answer.  Without these assumptions, a Rawlsian test can 
only fall back on ethical theory, which Boetzkes claims cannot do the job by itself.  Pure ethics, 
she says, “are underdetermined, inconclusive, or insufficiently contextual” and so cannot actually 
operationalize the reasonable person standard.  Taking the perspective of one sort of reasonable 
person (e.g. a white male) would help to avoid these insufficiencies, but only at the cost of 
making the reasonable person standard into a means of arbitrarily imposing one group’s values 
on other groups.
45
  On the second rejected test, “case law [would] be the measure of 
reasonableness.”  Although Boetzkes credits this approach with rightly acknowledging the 
importance of contextual details in a way that the Rawlsian test does not, she is right to say that it 
would be too limited in scope.  Because such a case-law test would be limited by “the exigencies 
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of cases finding their way to the courts,” it would be unable to address any scenarios that have 
not already been considered by the relevant legal bodies.  Such a test would also be inherently 
conservative in virtue of being precedent-based – a conservatism that, as in the Rawlsian test, 
would wrongly privilege one perspective.
46
 
In order to avoid this, one might attempt to pass over these monolithic tests in lieu of one 
that is more flexible – say, a test that seeks to identify the values and interests that most 
accurately represent a relevant population.  For Boetzkes, however, the problem with replacing 
either the Rawlsian or case-law test with a representative test is that “within [any] one 
community, a number of subcommunities and relevantly different groups exist.  Thus there 
are…a number of sets of defensible values (and which one should the reasonable person 
adopt?).”  Although not all relevantly different groups will follow a different set of defensible 
values, Boetzkes is certainly correct to say that there are enough acceptable value sets that this 
test “will not yield a single answer to the clinician’s dilemma”47 and so, assuming that a single 
answer is needed, will either fail to operationalize the standard or will operationalize it in a way 
that privileges one such value set over all others. 
One potential response, she notes, is to attempt to boil down the competing communal 
value sets to the point where all that remains is “some small set of mutually agreed upon political 
values, such as tolerance.”  Although this would have the effect of excluding many apparently 
valid considerations by removing those political values with significant but not sufficient 
support, it would at least go some ways towards finding a way to produce unambiguous and 
definitive answers to bioethical quandaries.  The trouble, however, is that it is basically a 
Rawlsian response, and so has basically the same problems as what Boetzkes called the Rawlsian 
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test.  Even if diverse communities are able to agree on a set of mutually acceptable political 
values, the content of those values will not be sufficient to guide action – as Boetzkes says, they 
would be too thin.  Of course, this should not come as a surprise: if the diverse subcommunities 
were able to reach substantive agreements on a wide variety of ethical issues, they would hardly 
be diverse and they would almost certainly not need to look towards the reasonable person 
standard as a way of guiding action in the face of multiple possible preferences and values. 
Though these are all good reasons for doubting that the reasonable person standard can 
provide the sorts of answers that Boetzkes requires of it, her requirements themselves seem to be 
misguided.  In order for the reasonable person standard to produce only one analysis of a given 
medical scenario regardless of the actual individuals involved in that scenario, it would have to 
be the case that any reasonable person would want, need, or do the same thing in that scenario.  
This follows from the definition of the reasonable person standard, which states that the standard 
identifies that which some hypothetical reasonable person would want, need, or do in a given 
scenario.  Very few authors seem to believe that all reasonable people would want, need, or do 
the same thing in the same situation, however.  Instead, it is far more common to read, as Robert 
Redmon states, that “it is difficult to predict how altruistic the ‘reasonable person’ would be in a 
moral situation.  It does make sense, however, to ask how a person with a particular moral 
outlook, particular values, virtues and vices, would act.”48  While Redmon does not make it clear 
whether or not the person with a particular outlook counts (or could count) as a reasonable 
person for the sake of this discussion, Childers, Lipsett, and Pawlik do, saying that “what a 
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‘reasonable’ person may want to know about a given medical intervention can vary depending on 
the unique characteristics of his or her disease, values, and life goals.”49  At first glance, then, it 
seems possible to respond to Boetzkes by saying that the reasonable person standard need not 
attempt to construct the reasonable person, as though such a being existed.  Rather, it only needs 
to make sure that its recommendations are consistent with what some reasonable person would 
want, need, or do.  While this of course cannot be determined without a sufficiently detailed 
description of the scenario in which the decision is being made, even that description alone will 
not be enough. 
Anyone attempting to look towards specific “values, virtues and vices,” however, must 
walk a fine line.  On the one side is the threat of falling back into the subjective standard in the 
way that Redmon appears to when he says that, in the case of surrogate decision-making for a 
comatose patient, the proper test of the reasonable person standard is what that patient would 
agree to “if he were awake, and rational.”50  If this is to be the test of the reasonable person 
standard, it will function the same way that the subjective standard does and will be open to the 
same criticisms.  In particular, it would be very difficult for a physician to determine any 
particular patient’s moral outlook, values, life goals, and so on, let alone to do this for every 
patient.  This objection is especially relevant for cases like Redmon’s, in which patients cannot 
communicate this information themselves.  Indeed, one of the supposed advantages of the 
reasonable person standard is that it can operate in an environment in which nothing substantive 
is known about the patient as an individual.  In a case described by Ghan-Shyam Lohiya, Lilia 
Tan-Figueroa, and Francis Crinella, for example, “[t]he patient was mentally incapable of 
preparing an advance health care directive, and he had never expressed a preference about end-
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of-life care or religion,” nor was such information supplied by his relatives or close 
acquaintances.
51
  Should the reasonable person standard require physicians to acquire 
information about the specific values and goals of each and every patient they treat, it will be an 
infeasible if not an impossible standard to apply in many cases. 
On the other hand, the reasonable person standard could aim to shortcut this process by 
understanding patients not as individuals but as part of a group that has a defensible set of values.  
In this case one would conduct some manner of research within each group in order to determine 
that group’s values or, more directly, in order to determine what a representative member of that 
group would want, need, or do in a given medical scenario.  The responses of the group would 
then be taken as authoritative for each individual case that conforms to the clinical description of 
the scenario and in which the primary subject of discussion (usually the patient or prospective 
research subject) is a member of the group.  This would eliminate the need to investigate each 
and every patient’s value set, but there are at least three problematic assumptions that must first 
be addressed.  For one, this sort of representative test cannot function unless people can (at least 
generally) be sorted into discrete groups based on their values and interests.  There is, after all, 
more than one way to separate a population by demographics,
52
 and each member of that 
population will belong to multiple demographic categories even in the most homogeneous of 
societies; in the language of sociology, identities are intersectional.
53
  So if it is discovered that 
Asian-Americans, Latin Americans, men, and women all have different defensible value sets 
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relative to a clinical scenario, for example, a person employing the reasonable person standard 
will have to be able to choose which value set to apply to Asian-American women. 
Assuming that it is possible to make these decisions in a way that reliably tracks the 
values and goals of the individuals who belong to demographic categories with conflicting value 
sets, there is still another challenge for the shortcut method of referring to a group’s values in 
lieu of an individual’s values.  Namely, that shortcut may, in fact, not be a shortcut at all.  While 
determining the values and goals of an individual person is certainly a time-consuming task, it 
may be similarly difficult to determine the right group to which to assign any individual patient.  
This is again especially true in the cases in which the patient cannot communicate at all or in 
which treatment must be provided on an emergency basis.  While there will always be some 
identity markers that are immediately apparent (race, sex, approximate age) there will also be 
others that are less obvious (religion, political affiliation, professional status). 
Third, it may be argued that the entire point of using a reasonable person standard is lost 
if a population is partitioned into statistically relevant demographic categories.  Historically, the 
reasonable person standard was used as a buffer against professional values being substituted for 
a broader set of interests, but it seems odd to expand that buffer.  For example, it seems strange 
to think that people under the age of 30 would need to be defended from the values and interests 
of people over the age of 30 in the same way that people in general need to be defended from the 
relatively narrow interests of some medical professionals.  Moreover, allowing the reasonable 
person standard to adapt to multiple groups’ values may make it unsuited to the contexts in 
which it has been used.  When it comes to establishing the content of a core disclosure, for 
example, generating multiple answers may seem to defeat the purpose.  A core disclosure or a 
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policy for surrogate decision-makers, one might think, is not truly a core disclosure or a 
decision-making policy unless it applies to everyone. 
Boetzkes challenges the first assumption in the context of managing the core disclosure 
given to women who might have genetically anomalous children, saying that “women’s 
decisionmaking processes are dynamic and individual.  [They] will result in different choices, 
depending on the circumstances of individual women’s lives and their respective moral 
identities.”  If the individual is the highest level of abstraction at which values and goals can be 
reliably correlated, as she suggests, there will be no groups to which to refer and so no group 
values or preferences for the standard to use.  On the other hand, though, Evelyn Chan and 
Daniel Sulmasy claim to have found empirical evidence as to the desired “content of informed 
consent [disclosures] for PSA [prostate-specific antigen] screening,”54 and Zeigler et al claim to 
have demonstrated a strong cross-demographic desire for “information from physicians 
concerning risk for adverse effects of medication, ‘no matter how rare’.”55  If these studies are 
statistically reliable, they provide two points in favor of using an empirical process for the 
reasonable person standard’s operational test. 
First, they show that it is at least sometimes possible to find medical scenarios about 
which groups of people agree.  Thus even if Boetzkes is right to say that no group opinions can 
now be found among women with regard to the question of bearing a genetically anomalous 
child, it is not necessary to abandon an empirical approach altogether.  Rather, one would only 
need to restrict its application to those cases where agreement exists.  As for identifying the 
informational needs or desires of a woman whose child has a genetic disorder, such a case would 
simply have to be decided some other way.  The second positive piece of evidence in the studies 
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of Ziegler et al. and Chan and Sulmasy is that they both find widespread agreement across 
demographic groups.  This goes some way towards eliminating the need to draw dividing lines 
between demographic categories as well as the need to identify individual patients as belonging 
primarily to only one of potentially multiple demographic groups, and so it helps to address the 
potential flaws in the assumptions that underlie an empirical approach.
56
 
Even if one accepts that there will be wide consensus in some cases, though, one might 
still question the applicability of the reasonable person standard when opinions are varied or 
empirical findings are inconclusive.  For example, if Boetzkes is right about women and 
reproductive decisions, is the reasonable person standard inapplicable to that case? Here the 
intersectional nature of social identities can actually be a benefit to the reasonable person 
standard.  Rather than simply accepting the initial finding that there is no single attitude that 
women take towards reproduction, it is possible to seek a more detailed view and so perhaps find 
agreements at the subcommunity level (for example, African-American women or women 
between the ages of 25 and 30).  If this, too, fails to provide any convincing consensus, then the 
reasonable person standard may indeed not be applicable to that case at that moment in time.  
Because values and attitudes change over time, however, neither the presence nor absence of a 
consensus should be taken as the last word on the matter.  Rather, groups should be re-surveyed 
as time passes in order to ensure that the reasonable person standard is not incorrectly operating 
on the basis of values held only or primarily by the dead. 
The third assumption, that the reasonable person standard can be responsive to groups’ 
values without losing either its essence or its usefulness, requires justification of an altogether 
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different sort.  Although it is true that the reasonable person standard was historically intended to 
shield laypeople against the narrow interests that can come to dominate a professional’s mindset, 
this is not a unique case but rather one instance of a more general scenario.  Evaluating a 
situation using only a narrow set of professional values and interests is not problematic because 
the values and interests in question are professional but because they are narrow – that is, 
because they represent, at best, a small subset of the full set of values and interests at play.  
Accordingly, insofar as the reasonable person standard is concerned only with making sure that 
narrow professional values do not dominate bioethical decision-making, it will be unable to 
speak to the cases in which decision-makers wrongly rely on narrow value sets from non-
professional sources.  Worse yet, it will be unable to speak to those cases in which decision-
makers wrongly rely on a robust collection of values and interests other than the collection that 
actually applies to the case at hand.  This is the de facto presumption of “cultural homogeneity 
and gender neutrality” that Boetzkes is right to wish to avoid, for even if medical culture is not 
the culture in question there are still relevant differences that would necessarily go unconsidered 
by a monolithic reasonable person standard. 
As for the matter of whether the concept of having, for example, multiple core 
disclosures is incoherent or self-defeating, one must start by remembering what the core 
disclosure is meant to accomplish.  Core disclosures are part of the informed consent process, 
which exists to serve the autonomy and welfare of patients and potential research subjects.  More 
specifically, they are intended to provide patients and potential research subjects with 
information about the medical decisions they face that is basic but that will support their ability 
to make those decisions in an informed way.  Although much of this information will be the 
same for most if not all individuals, it is not difficult to imagine that there will be some variation 
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in the information that individuals need.  Beauchamp and Childress, for example, begin their list 
of core information with “those facts or descriptions that patients or subjects usually consider 
material in deciding whether to refuse or consent to the proposed intervention or research,”57 and 
it would hardly be surprising to find that such facts and descriptions vary across sub-populations.  
In the case that different groups want or need different information in this way, it would not 
advance, but would rather hinder the purpose of a core disclosure to insist on having only one 
core disclosure that contains only that information which is wanted or needed by a simple 
majority of the whole population.  The idea of a core disclosure is to ensure that all patients or 
prospective research subjects receive equal protection and support, not to ensure that they all 
receive identical information, and so a reasonable person standard that points to the need for 
multiple core disclosures would not defeat the purpose of a core disclosure. 
 
2.1.2 Two Difficult Cases 
It may seem, then, that the reasonable person standard can be applied with relative ease 
whenever a consensus exists among a group with defensible values, even if there may be some 
cases in which there simply is no such consensus.  Unfortunately, however, things are not so 
clean-cut.  There are at least two scenarios in which one must be able to distinguish between 
competing consensuses. 
The first of these is when an individual belongs to two or more demographic groups 
which have conflicting consensuses (i.e., whose views on the matter in question point to 
mutually exclusive actions).  For example, consider a patient who requires a routine blood 
transfusion at the risk of death is (for whatever reason) incapable of making that decision at the 
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time but is known to be both a male and a Jehovah’s Witness.  In such a case, the reasonable 
person standard for surrogate decision-making will, at least initially, likely point in two 
incompatible directions.  Assuming that men in general would want the transfusion and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in general would refuse it (and on the further assumption that both groups 
are using an acceptable set of values to make their decisions), anyone attempting to apply the 
reasonable person standard in the way described heretofore would have to choose to privilege the 
individual’s sexual identity over his religious one or vice versa; it is, of course, impossible both 
to accept and refuse a transfusion.  One potential way of avoiding this choice would be to simply 
abandon the standard altogether and thereby consign this sort of case to the same category as the 
cases in which there is no known consensus or agreement among any of the relevant social 
groups.  There is, however, another option. 
Because the empirical operational test for the reasonable person standard creates not just 
an abstracted set of values and interests but an approximated set thereof, it seems appropriate to 
seek the best such approximation that is available.  To continue the example above, assume that 
only 70% of men would want the transfusion but that 90% of Jehovah’s Witnesses would refuse 
it, with comparable statistical accuracy.  In such a case one would not be given a choice between 
two pieces of conflicting evidence with equal weight.  Rather, one piece of evidence can be taken 
to outweigh the other on the basis of its statistically significantly greater accuracy: given the 
information above, it would simply be a better guess to conclude that the reasonable person 
standard would support withholding the transfusion from a male Jehovah’s Witness who cannot 
express himself and for whom no reliable surrogate can be found. 
There are some complications and limitations to this approach, of course.  For one, there 
may be times when one of the two demographic groups is a strict subset of the other.  If women 
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typically want a procedure but women who are 65 years of age or older typically do not want that 
same procedure, it would be a mistake to compare the correlations of those two findings.  The 
latter would always be a better guess when the patient falls into that age group because it would 
be free of irrelevant information.  Another kind of difficulty would occur when there is no 
statistical significance between the conflicting findings.  In that case, the empirical process could 
not produce any helpful results and would have to be set aside. 
In addition to surveying more precisely defined populations, another way of sharpening 
the empirical component of the representative test would be to privilege the responses of those 
individuals who can speak directly to the experience of having made a given decision.  Because 
the strength of the reasonable person standard is its adherence to the actual interests of the group 
in question, it would be appropriate to seek out only those members of the group who have the 
best understanding of their own interests.  While this is normally a contentious subject – imagine 
trying to argue that men generally knew better than women (or vice versa) – there should be 
nothing controversial in acknowledging that people who have had direct, firsthand experience 
with a scenario are better equipped to evaluate that scenario than people who are attempting to 
do the same thing at a distance.  Given the existence of “‘happiness gaps’…observed between 
the self-rated quality of life of people with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of 
what their quality of life would be if they had those conditions,”58 it would not be unfair or 
inappropriate for the reasonable person standard to privilege the input of individuals who are less 
strongly affected by the psychological biases that form those gaps. 
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Ideally, this would mean acquiring input from people who actually have lived with or 
lived through all of the potential kinds of health outcomes facing an individual patient.  If an 
individual faces the choice between having a hand amputated and having that same hand 
transplanted, for example, it would be best to know how both amputees and transplant patients 
have responded to their respective treatments.  Of course, this is not always possible, because 
sometimes the potential health outcomes include scenarios like death, in which case one cannot 
ask an individual to report on what it is like to live with or live through that health state.  To the 
extent that an empirical comparison cannot be made between the competing options, the 
empirical process will be less (although not necessarily un-) reliable.
59
 
Nonetheless, in the cases where such a comparison is possible it may well be unfair not to 
make use of it.  If the reasonable person standard aims to uphold the values and interests of 
individuals in populations with defensible values and there is good evidence that the majority of 
those people would inadvertently choose to undermine their own values and interests due to 
something like a psychological bias, there is no reason why the reasonable person standard 
should not overrule the majority in favor of a better-informed or less biased minority.  This is 
one way that the reasonable person standard can adapt to meet the objection that “patients often 
do not know what information would be relevant for their deliberations” and likewise often do 
not know which treatment option is in their best interests: insofar as reasonable individuals can 
be found who do know these things, they can serve as community representatives without 
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compromising the standard’s integrity.60  There will still be hard cases for the reasonable person 
standard no matter how well an empirical process is designed or implemented, but it is far from 
impossible to perform such a test in a way that provides the needed results and that does so in a 
way that is broadly consistent with the purpose of the standard. 
2.2 DELIMITING THE REASONABLE OPTIONS 
Assuming that an empirical process that uses statistical data to inform the reasonable 
person standard can provide the needed specificity without thereby violating the spirit of the 
standard, there is still at least one more question to be asked.  To wit, are there any limits to what 
the reasonable person standard can require? 
As part of an argument against the standard, T.M. Wilkinson produces a dilemma about 
this very question.  “If the test of what subjects should be told is what reasonable people would 
want to know, and if ‘reasonableness’ covers the content of views and not simply statistical 
unlikeliness,” he says, “then information need not be provided which would only affect the 
decisions to participate of those with unreasonable beliefs.”61  This is an important point because 
a strictly representative test would only be able to consider the prevalence of a view within a 
given population (i.e., the percentage of people within that population who hold that view).  A 
reasonable belief, on such a test, would simply be one that is held by a majority (or significant 
minority) of the population, regardless of what the belief actually is.  This runs counter to the 
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intuition that some ideas cannot be reasonable no matter who believes in them because their 
content is unreasonable in and of itself.  Wilkinson lists three examples of such beliefs: a fear of 
“genetically-engineered ingredients (which…have been proven safe)”; “an irrational fear of 
needles”; and anti-Semitism.  Because all three are unreasonable beliefs, a reasonable person 
standard that governs content as well as statistical prevalence would judge all three beliefs to be 
unworthy of consideration and so would excuse researchers from disclosing information to 
satisfy information interests based on any of the three beliefs.  He concludes that, while this is 
the correct judgment in the case of anti-Semitic beliefs, “[i]t seems clear that, in virtually all 
cases like [the first two], subjects should be told and that, at least, not telling them is at some cost 
to their autonomy.”  On the other hand, if the reasonable person standard refrains from 
examining the content of views then it “provides no reason not to require disclosure of [a] 
researcher’s Jewishness,” and this, too, is unacceptable.62 
Although Wilkinson’s dilemma was crafted in the context of disclosure for human-
subjects research, it applies to the other contexts as well.  Should the reasonable person standard 
restrict the range of permissible views based on their content, that restriction would have to be 
based in a set of values and preferences other than the set of values and preferences that is being 
judged unreasonable.  This increases the risk of judging what an individual would need, want, or 
do based on interests that the individual does not in fact have.
63
  Similarly, to overrule the 
representative judgment of a potential subject population is to accept a greater risk of 
misidentifying that population’s interests, at least prima facie.  But if the reasonable person 
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standard has no content-based restrictions, then patients could in theory identify any treatment 
whatsoever as being in their best interests, and prospective subject populations could demand 
any information at all from researchers.  Nor would these options be limited to medical ones: as 
Wilkinson says, a total lack of content-based restrictions means that the reasonable person 
standard could not even exclude views like “It is in my best interests not to be resuscitated by a 
woman” or “This study poses too great a risk because it is run by Jews.”  If the reasonable person 
standard is to be acceptable, it must find a way to resolve this dilemma. 
One place to start is to examine Wilkinson’s concept of reasonableness.  Although he 
never explicitly defines the term, he associates it with concepts such as “unjustified” and 
“irrational.”  This is quite different from Boetzkes’s usage of the concept, according to which a 
reasonable person is one who believes and behaves according to an ethically “defensible set of 
values.”  On this definition, neither an irrational fear of needles nor an unjustified fear of 
genetically modified food would count as unreasonable, for although both fears are ungrounded 
neither is ethically indefensible.  Anti-Semitic beliefs, however, would still be excluded from 
reasonableness.  It may therefore seem as though using Boetzkes’s definition of “reasonable” is 
sufficient to defeat Wilkinson’s dilemma.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Although 
Boetzkes’s definition of “reasonable” goes some way towards resolving the difficulties involved 
with adding a content-based constraint to an otherwise empirically-based reasonable person 
standard, there is at least one scenario that it cannot fully address, namely, when an action or 
belief is ethically defensible in a broad sense but does not seem to be compatible with the 
specific goals of the contexts in which the standard is applied.  For instance, the “deeply rooted 
cultural…wish not to convey or receive negative information” present among some Navajo 
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certainly does not seem to be ethically indefensible but, if honored, would “essentially [remove] 
the ‘informed’ aspect” from informed consent.64 
There are also examples of broadly ethical actions that run up against the goals of a 
specific context outside of the context of informed consent.  Researchers may want to sweeten 
the risk/benefit ratio in their protocols by adding financial incentives for participation, and some 
patients who enter a doctor’s care in an incapacitated state may face a non-medical fate worse 
than death
65
 if their capacity is restored so that it is in their best interests not to receive medically 
indicated treatment.  Nonetheless, any attempt to tip the risk/benefit scales with money would 
run afoul of Emanuel, Wendler, and Gray’s rule that “extraneous benefits…cannot be considered 
in delineating the benefits compared with the risks,”66 and it seems unequivocally wrong for a 
doctor to let a patient die or remain unconscious in order to keep that patient from returning to a 
terrible home life. 
In all of these examples, the belief or action in question cannot be dismissed because it is 
ethically indefensible.  But even though none of the beliefs or actions in these cases is ethically 
indefensible in the same way that, say, anti-Semitism is, they all seem to be the wrong beliefs to 
honor or actions to perform in their respective contexts.  A further difficulty is that many of these 
cases cannot be resolved by homing in on the ethical goal(s) of the context in question.  Even 
though it would advance an individual’s autonomy at no cost to that individual’s welfare if that 
individual were informed of his or her doctor’s political leanings – that is, even though such a 
disclosure appears to be fully in line with the ethical goals of informed consent – this information 
does not seem to fit in a standard disclosure, and no popular consensus would change this.  More 
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problematically yet, there are some cases in which the reasonable person standard cannot even be 
saved by limiting its range of responses to those that are broadly ethically defensible.
67
  But that 
is not to say that the reasonable person standard cannot be saved at all. 
To conceive of the reasonable person standard in the context of, say, human subjects 
protection in medical research as attempting to balance the risks and benefits per se is to forget 
that medical human subjects protection is itself a subcontext of medicine.  Accordingly, the risks 
and benefits that must be balanced when one seeks to protect potential human subjects of 
biomedical research are only those risks and benefits that are pertinent when viewed through “the 
institutions, practices, and traditions of medicine.”68  One way of accounting for pertinence is to 
use something like Wilkinson’s own Relevance Rule, which he develops in the context of 
disclosure but which can easily be made to apply to other contexts.  According to this rule, 
researchers are obligated “to divulge [their views] (i) when they are relevant, where relevance is 
determined by some conceptual connection with the nature of the research and (ii) when there is 
some reasonably high chance that some potential subjects would consider those views significant 
in deciding on participation.”69  If the second criterion is taken to be satisfied by empirical data, 
Wilkinson’s Relevance Rule begins to look a great deal like the empirical process for the 
reasonable person standard, on which information should be disclosed when a population desires 
it and it is medically relevant. It is important that the relevance be of a medical sort, however, 
and not just relevance broadly speaking.  Again, to apply this same thinking to human subjects 
protection, it would certainly benefit a research subject to hand that person a seven-figure check, 
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but this kind of benefit is not one that is properly captured or addressed by medical institutions or 
practices and so is not one that should be permitted or factored in as a benefit when making 
bioethical calculations regarding the risk/benefit ratio of a proposed medical research project. 
Because the reasonable person standard needs to have its considerations limited by what 
is relevant to the institutions and practices of medicine, some group will have to decide the 
boundaries of that relevance.  While this task could again be handed off to the reasonable 
populations whose input would be delimited, it is not clear that the reasonable person standard 
ought to go that far.  A belief about medical relevance is not, after all, a value or an interest itself 
even if it bears on values and interests.  Using an empirical process to determine medical 
relevance, then, would not necessarily help the reasonable person standard to protect or promote 
the values and interests of reasonable people.  Arguably, an independent constraint would be 
necessary even if an empirical process for determining medical relevance did protect or promote 
those values, because it is implausible to think that a medical system can function without some 
level of consistency. 
If the population responsible for oversight of the empirical process should not be the 
reasonable populations whose input needs that oversight, perhaps this is the point at which the 
reasonable person standard should seek the input of a professional group.  Physicians, however, 
probably are probably still not fit for this function, as their specialized training deals with 
practicing medicine but not understanding or analyzing the way in which ethical values are 
protected or promoted by its traditions, institutions, or practices.  However much of the latter is 
required by the former, physicians simply do not have the in-depth understanding of the 
connection between ethics and medicine that one would expect of, say, bioethicists, whose 
training consists precisely in connecting the values of ethics to the practices and traditions of 
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medicine.  Other specialties may be needed from time to time depending on the nature of the 
specific question being asked,
70
 but it seems probable that bioethicists will be able to act as the 
central group that provides the required constraints on any empirical research that is done as part 
of an operational test for the reasonable person standard.  And, since bioethicists already perform 
much of the research of this sort, they are well-positioned to do so. 
 
2.2.1 Bioethicists Alone? 
Given the need to subject the preferences of populations to independent oversight, it may 
seem as though there is no need to obtain those preferences in the first place.  Rather, one would 
simply rely on the independent oversight to identify what an individual should need, want, or do.  
In this case, the reasonable person standard would be used to identify the course of action that is 
appropriate in a given situation without privileging one set of preferences over another.  
Although this approach has the advantage of being universally applicable should it succeed, its 
chances of success are rather slim because, as Boetzkes suggests, ethical thinking that proceeds 
without using a particular set of preferences is often incapable of reaching one and only one 
conclusion firmly.  As such, in many cases it would be mistaken to think that the broad limits 
placed on the reasonable person standard
71
 could be tightened enough to generate sufficiently 
specific recommendations for action in most cases.  In the context of disclosure, for example, it 
may be the case that such specificity is not needed because one can always just add more to the 
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content of a core disclosure during the process of informed consent.
72
  When making decisions 
for those who lack the capacity to do so, however, there is no reliable way to accommodate such 
differences; one can disclose a range of information because disclosing one thing is not mutually 
exclusive with disclosing something else, but one cannot make a range of decisions.  Similarly, it 
may be the case that there are some instances in which there really is clearly only one acceptable 
course of action.  A patient who is admitted to the hospital with severe hyperkalemia, for 
example, will almost certainly lack decision-making capacity but can be cured so easily and at so 
little cost that, in the absence of access to specific knowledge of the patient’s own values, a best 
interests standard would be very unlikely to permit non-treatment.  In these cases, however, there 
is no need for a standard at all, properly speaking.  Standards, after all, are designed to be 
employed when the dictates of ethics are unclear or imprecise, but this is not the case when there 
is strong ethical consensus that only one course of action is appropriate.
73
  In order for the 
reasonable person standard to succeed as a standard across a broad range of contexts and cases, 
then, preferences seemingly must be involved at some stage or other. 
 One author who attempts to incorporate preferences into bioethical considerations 
without reducing those considerations to questions about preferences is Daniel Hausman.  In his 
writings on health, Hausman argues that, “No matter how carefully considered, a population’s 
consensus that x is a better health state than y does not make it so. To know that most people 
think that health state x is worse than health state y may be of interest, especially if one also finds 
out people’s reasons. But…it no more settles the evaluation, than the opinion of the population 
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concerning policy alternatives determines which is best.”74  While this is certainly true when it 
comes to determining relatively objective facts, this sort of reasoning is not immediately 
applicable to the reasonable person standard for the simple reason that the reasonable person 
standard is not used to determine facts that are as relatively objective as the ones that Hausman 
considers.  Rather, the reasonable person standard, howsoever articulated, is used in contexts 
where individuals’ preferences and values bear heavily on the matter at hand.  When attempting 
to identify the best interests of an incapacitated patient, for example, it is not enough to know 
which treatment option would result in greater health for that individual.  It is never healthier to 
die than to live, yet there are cases in which there is a real question as to whether or not it would 
be in a patient’s best interests to be kept alive.  Similarly, one frequently cannot deduce the 
materiality of a potential side-effect of a medication just from a detailed description of the side-
effect itself, because information is material to any given individual only insofar as that 
particular individual would use the information in a decision-making process. 
Hausman, however, provides several arguments to the effect that health evaluations 
depend on relatively objective facts even when those facts are not easily accessible.  For one, he 
says, people often presume that “it is better to rely on evaluations made by those who are more 
knowledgeable,” which is a sign that “there are more or less accurate comparisons of health 
states [and so] the evaluation of health states involves the judgment of something ‘external.’”  
Indeed, one reason to choose a representative rather than an ideal understanding of the 
reasonable person standard is that it will be more accurate in virtue of attending to the actual 
values and preferences of populations instead of the values and preferences that those 
populations would have if they were idealized in some sense.  Yet, as Hausman says, “if one 
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wants to measure preferences, one should seek a representative sample, while if one seeks to 
elicit reliable opinions, then one would look for respondents whose opinions are more likely to 
be correct.”  If one really must make a choice between representativeness and reliability, the 
representative understanding of the reasonable person standard would seem to be a clearly 
inferior one. 
His second argument is that most groups are rightly “committed to overruling some 
preferences,” such as ones that “value men’s health more highly than women’s health”75 or that 
“cherish impairments such as epilepsy as signs of divine favor.”76  Even if these preferences are 
informed and are stable under rational investigation (i.e., are not merely knee-jerk reactions 
instead of mature preferences), Hausman is right to suggest that they should be disregarded by 
decision-makers.  If this is the case, however, it is difficult to see why decisions or evaluations 
should be based on preferences instead of the objective facts of the case.  Then again, Hausman 
says, the very need to ensure that the preferences expressed by a population are stable under 
rational investigation is an indication that those preferences are actually “judgment[s] and 
dependent on reasons” rather than preferences as such.77  Because these reasons pertain to “the 
character and consequences of health states,”78 it seems as though it would be both more direct 
and generate more accurate results to consider the relevant health states themselves instead of 
attempting to generate a population-typical appraisal of those health states. 
And, of course, there is no guarantee that a given population ever will be able to reach a 
set of preferences or judgments that are informed and stable under rational investigation.  Too 
little information and investigation will obviously result in unreliability, which is why groups 
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such as the World Health Organization employ a battery of corrective methods when surveying 
populations about health-related matters.
79
  Unfortunately, the same problem also arises with too 
much information and investigation.
80
  In the best case, it appears, members of the surveyed 
population would be on par with experts, in which case there would seem to be no reason not to 
ask the experts directly;
81
 in the worst case, members of the surveyed population would not be 
able to provide reliable enough responses at all.  If this is all correct, any empirical component of 
the reasonable person standard would effectively be useless – or, worse still, would produce 
harmful results.  However, there are good reasons to think that Hausman’s conclusions are 
overstated. 
One such reason is that Hausman himself holds that “measuring preferences plays an 
important role” in evaluating health states because “[o]ne of the things that makes one health 
state better than another is that people prefer it.”82  It is at least conceivable, therefore, that there 
could be some cases in which preferences act as the deciding factor when evaluating health 
states: if states X and Y are (nearly) equivalent on their objective merits but one group prefers X 
and a second group prefers Y, even Hausman would have to say that X is healthier for the first 
group but not for the second.  Moreover, it is exceedingly unlikely that any expert would know 
about these preferences without having conducted at least some empirical research. 
As Hausman suggests, this research should not ignore the differences between reliable 
and unreliable representatives of a given population.  Reliability, however, does not necessarily 
presuppose objectivity or the existence of “something ‘external.’”  While people can obviously 
have unreliable ideas about objective features of reality, individuals can also be mistaken about 
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their own preferences, values, and interests.  Removing biases and misconceptions from an 
individual’s thinking is not the same as forcing that individual to focus on external factors, such 
as the character and consequences of a health state or the technical details of a medical 
procedure.  That there are better (less biased, better informed) and worse reasoners is therefore 
not an indication of the need to choose between reliability and representativeness; that the truth 
of a belief depends on something external to the belief itself does not mean that it depends on 
something external to the believer.  To the contrary, the two are actually mutually supportive in 
many cases: the more reliably a group can think about medical scenarios (e.g. living in various 
health states), the more its conclusions about those issues will represent the actual experiences of 
people in those scenarios. 
Nor is the representative view of the reasonable person standard threatened by the fact 
that some people prefer morally or medically unacceptable things.  Again, neither the reasonable 
person standard nor any other standard is needed to reject the view that a man’s health counts 
more than a woman’s, so to apply the reasonable person standard to that case would be an error 
to start with.  In such instances, the matter should indeed be resolved on the merits of the 
objective components of the case – but since the reasonable person was never meant to apply to 
such cases in the first place, that is hardly a strike against it.  As for Hausman’s argument that 
people base their assessments of health states on reason-driven judgments rather than 
preferences, he is at best partly correct.  Although judgments are based on reasons, those reasons 
are not all likely to be relatively objective.  Just knowing the medical details of a medical 
condition is not necessarily sufficient to predict its effect on the health of any given individual, 
let alone its effect on far less objective factors such as materiality.  To complete the picture, 
subjective considerations such as preferences and values must be included. 
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Hausman, however, could accept the importance of accounting for the values that people 
actually have while still arguing that populations should not be surveyed about specific medical 
scenarios.  The way in which he could do this is by suggesting the use of a predictive test for the 
reasonable person standard.  If experts can broadly identify a given population’s values and 
interests, perhaps through the use of an empirical process like the one outlined above, they might 
be able to use those values and interests to deduce or predict that population’s preference in any 
particular case.  Knowing that members of a given population typically attribute great 
importance to their appearance, for example, might lead one to conclude that cosmetic side-
effects of proposed treatments should be part of the core disclosure to members of that 
population even if those same side-effects would not appear in a core disclosure for a different 
group.  Although this is certainly a more representative approach than one based solely on 
“external” factors in that it adheres to the actual preferences of the population in question more 
closely than would an approach that is focused on “external” factors, it will only work insofar as 
people reason about medical issues in straightforward, logical ways.
83
  To the extent that 
populations have not just idiosyncratic values but also idiosyncratic ways of applying those 
values to medical scenarios, simply identifying their values will not be enough to correctly 
predict their interests in particular cases.  Without taking into account the ways in which 
populations reason about medical issues, experts who try to translate general values into 
scenario-specific preferences risk idealizing those preferences.  Alternatively, as Hausman 
suggests, they may not even be able to do that, because just having some general values may not 
even be enough to generate one specific evaluation of a medical scenario.  “Health states can be 
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evaluated or judged in several different ways,”84 so the expert-prediction test for the reasonable 
person standard may turn out to be inconclusive in the same way that pure ethical considerations 
are inconclusive. 
A more fundamental problem with any attempt to idealize the reasonable person standard 
is that it is meant to serve individuals’ actual autonomy, best interests, or well-being, not the 
autonomy, best interests, or well-being that could be ascribed to them if they were idealized in 
some sense (in other words, the autonomy, best interests, or well-being that they should, in some 
sense, have).  To return to an earlier example, it should not be the case that one could upset the 
balance between a patient’s autonomy and welfare just by telling that individual about the 
possibility of a negative health outcome following a medical procedure.  In an ideal world, that is 
to say, there would be no reason not to include the possibility of negative outcomes in the core 
disclosure for a given procedure.  But in the real world there are individuals for whom learning 
about the possibility of a negative outcome will generate a conflict between their welfare and 
their autonomy – namely, some members of the Navajo tribe.  It may well be the case that people 
should, in some sense, not hold to the traditional Navajo beliefs that are responsible for this – 
those beliefs may, for instance, not be rational – but it would do no good to act on the 
idealization and not the reality. 
This is not to say that the reasonable person standard will fail automatically in virtue of 
referring to an abstraction.  Because it is used in cases where generalized policies are needed 
because case-by-case evaluations are not possible,
85
 the reasonable person standard will always 
operate abstractly to some degree.  But this does not mean that any degree or kind of abstraction 
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is acceptable.  If some specific fact is known to be material for most people in a group but would 
not be considered material by an ideal member of that group, it would at least partially defeat the 
purpose of using a reasonable person standard to privilege the ideal interpretation over the 
representative one.
86
  Regardless of whether or not an individual’s autonomy (e.g.) should be 
protected by the disclosure of (or failure to disclose) a certain fact, the reasonable person 
standard should counsel the course of action that is most likely to actually protect that 
individual’s autonomy (or best interests, or well-being, as the case may be). 
Be this as it may, there is still the possibility that it is just not feasible to devise and 
operate a representative test for the reasonable person standard.  As Hausman suggests, there 
may simply be too many cognitive obstacles to overcome: between “framing, instability, and 
inconsistency,”87 there seem to be ample indicators that populations in general will not be able to 
provide reliable preferences.  If not, perhaps these preferences will be too mercurial, so that any 
instance of a representative test will have a prohibitively short shelf life.  And even if the test 
itself is not the problem, there is the question of whether or not its results can be used by 
physicians and other health care workers.  After all, if it is overly taxing to expect physicians to 
recall one long list of potential side effects from memory, surely it would only make things 
worse to require them to recall multiple such lists and to pair each list with a group or 
population. 
Before these objections are investigated individually, it must be noted that they apply to 
the predictive test as well as the representative one.  Whatever cognitive obstacles are present for 
people in general are probably present for experts as well, so if biases are enough to make a 
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representative test unreliable then they would probably do the same to a predictive test.  
Likewise, if a population’s relevant preferences change too quickly for a representative test to be 
useful, they would probably change too quickly for a predictive test as well.  And, of course, a 
predictive test that separates the general population into many sub-groups will put just as much 
of a burden on health care professionals as a representative test that does the same thing.  
Moreover, even if all of the difficulties with the predictive reasonable person standard are 
overcome, it will be impossible to know that experts are making the right predictions without 
checking them against at least some examples of representative empirical findings, so in any case 
there will still be at least some reason to conduct representative research. 
In all likelihood, though, neither a representative nor a predictive test will be significantly 
impeded by the pragmatic considerations listed above.  By seeking those individuals who have 
lived with or lived through medical scenarios, researchers can eliminate many of the biases that 
might otherwise make their judgments unreliable.  Other biases can be corrected by using proper 
experimental methods, some examples of which are listed in Hausman’s articles.88  As for the 
shelf life of a given preference, there may well be some medical issues that are so controversial 
or about which information changes so rapidly that any empirical research on the subject will be 
outdated by the time it could be put to use.  In such cases, it is hard to imagine any test 
succeeding, and it may even be necessary to use another standard altogether.  But most medical 
issues do not fall into this category, and most people have values and preferences that are stable 
enough to be relied upon.  Last, it seems implausible to suggest that health care professionals 
cannot keep track of and use detailed and changing information about group preferences in the 
same ways that they keep track of and use detailed and changing information about human 
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biology.  Again, there is nothing in the representative (or any other) test for the reasonable 
person standard that would require doctors or nurses to memorize any such information.  
Technology is more than capable of providing easy ways to find and retrieve information, so the 
most significant burden that would be placed on health care workers would be the relatively 
minimal one of learning how to use a new piece of software. 
Of course, it would be impossible to implement any test without exerting at least some 
effort.  But it does not seem that the effort required by the representative test is so great as to 
make the test impracticable.  If this is the case, there appears to be little reason not to use the 
reasonable person standard as a way of ensuring that the relevant preferences of real people are 
honored as often as possible in the three contexts already identified. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
Ethical decision-making in medicine is often extraordinarily complicated.  In order to 
make good decisions in the face of that complexity, one can use various standards as bridges 
between abstract ethical values and the concrete facts of the matter.  There is no one standard to 
use in every case, however.  Rather, the proper standard depends in large part on the context in 
which it is to be applied.  Because there are some contexts in which individuals’ diverse values 
and interests are central to ethical decision-making, any standard used in those contexts will have 
to be able to account for and adjust to those diverse values.  The reasonable person standard can 
do this, and so is a strong candidate for use in those contexts.  However, the reasonable person 
standard can be misused.  It can be used monolithically, under the assumption that there is some 
such thing as the reasonable person rather than a collection of reasonable worldviews.  It can also 
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be used naively, ignoring the real presence of biases and other cognitive deficiencies that make it 
difficult to assess things like health states.  But these are obstacles that the reasonable person 
standard can overcome. 
This does not mean, however, that it will always be obvious when and how to apply the 
reasonable person standard.  Although the reasonable person standard is commonly applied in 
the three contexts in this paper, it may well be the case that one or more of them typically does 
not call for any standard at all.  And even if decision-making is difficult enough in all three 
contexts to justify the use of something like the reasonable person standard, that does not mean 
that the standard can or should be applied to every case within those contexts.  Because the 
reasonable person standard as outlined herein is designed to be responsive to peoples’ values and 
interests, it should not be used when those values and interests are mostly or entirely irrelevant to 
the issue at hand.  Moreover, as investigators have discovered, one must be exceedingly cautious 
when eliciting predictions about how an individual would react to a given medical scenario – 
even when one elicits those predictions from the individual him- or herself.  Still, it is neither 
impossible nor prohibitively difficult to acquire reliable empirical data from representative 
members of society.  In the absence of compelling ethical or bioethical consensus about a given 
question that pertains to the content of a core disclosure, to the best interests of a patient who 
lacks decision-making capacity, or to the risk/benefit ratio of a study that would use human 
subjects, the reasonable person standard can be relied upon to generate an answer. 
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